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Five Unanswered Questions from 
Trump v. Hawaii 
Josh Blackman* 
Trump v. Hawaii upheld President Trump’s travel ban in 
its entirety. This article explores five questions left open by the 
majority opinion. First, what will happen on remand with 
respect to discovery? Second, how should lower courts treat 
“this President,” as opposed to “the President”? Third, how 
does the Constitution apply to aliens who are not seeking entry 
into the United States but have already crossed the border? 
Fourth, what is the scope of the president’s Article II power to 
exclude aliens? Lastly, what is the permissible scope of a 
nationwide injunction? The judiciary will likely have to address 
these issues in the near future. 
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Introduction 
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the third 
iteration of President Trump’s travel ban in its entirety.1 This 
outcome should not have been much of a surprise. In December, a 
majority of the Supreme Court allowed the entirety of that policy to 
go into effect temporarily.2 Over the past decade, when the Roberts  
* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston. This essay 
builds on and incorporates prior writings that were published on the 
Lawfare Blog, SCOTUSBlog, and other outlets. 
1. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
2. Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court Tips its Hand on Travel Ban 3.0, 
LAWFARE (Dec. 4, 2017, 10:30 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-tips-its-hand-travel-ban-30 
[https://perma.cc/UE4K-E5N4]. 
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Court has stayed a lower court’s ruling, it has almost always reversed 
its judgment.3 This case was no exception. Furthermore, the court 
resolved the legality of the presidential proclamation in its entirety.4 
The justices did not settle on some sort of Solomonic split. For 
example, the government could deny entry to aliens with non-
immigrant visas but must admit aliens with immigrant visas. 
President Trump prevailed on all claims. The majority opinion, 
however, leaves open at least five unanswered questions that the 
judiciary will likely have to address in the near future. This essay will 
discuss those questions.  
I. What happens on remand with respect to 
discovery? 
The government appealed Trump v. Hawaii to the Supreme Court 
after preliminary injunctions were issued by district courts in Hawaii 
and Maryland.5 The Hawaii decision concluded only that the plaintiffs 
were unlikely to succeed on the merits at this preliminary phase.6 It 
was not, and could not have been, a final judgment on the merits. 
The penultimate sentence of the chief justice’s opinion explains that 
“[t]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”7 
On remand, therefore, the plaintiffs are within their rights to seek 
a summary judgment, and even a trial, about whether the 
proclamation is unlawful. It is unlikely that additional proceedings 
would alter the Court’s statutory analysis, which involved pure 
questions of law.8 However, further proceedings could shed light on 
the “animus”9 question with respect to the Establishment Clause. 
Noah Feldman, relaying comments from his colleague Owen 
Fiss, points out that “the standard of proof of bias that the plaintiffs 
would have to meet could actually be lower at trial than in their 
 
3. Josh Blackman, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Equitable Ruling in 
Trump v. IRAP, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 12, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-understanding-supreme-courts-
equitable-ruling-trump-v-irap/ [https://perma.cc/7AMD-2N3G].  
4. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2423. 
5. Id. at 2406. 
6. Id. at 2423. 
7. Id. 
8. See id. at 2408 (emphasizing the purely statutory and legal discretion of 
the President’s authority). 
9. See id. at 2416-18 (discussing the potential animus arguments based on 
President Trump’s statements on Muslims that were not considered by 
the Supreme Court who instead looked at the neutral effect/purpose of 
the Proclamation). 
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action seeking a preliminary injunction.”10 They are correct. Even if 
no further evidence is added to the record, it is entirely foreseeable 
that the district courts could rule against President Trump once 
again. But the record is not sealed. Feldman adds that “the plaintiffs 
could seek discovery to uncover new evidence of Trump’s thinking, 
including, potentially, drafts of the executive order or memos about 
it.”11 
Without question, the plaintiffs will seek discovery. They always 
do. And the district courts very well may oblige such requests. 
Following the lead of Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, the district 
courts could probe whether, in fact, exemptions are being granted 
under the terms of the proclamation.12 If the government wants to 
avoid another trip to the Supreme Court, it should implement the 
waiver policies in a liberal fashion.  
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion, however, erects 
important guardrails for allowing discovery beyond official records, 
such as waiver requests.13 First, Justice Kennedy questions “[w]hether 
judicial proceedings may properly continue in this case, in light of the 
substantial deference that is and must be accorded to the Executive 
in the conduct of foreign affairs, and in light of today’s decision, is a 
matter to be addressed in the first instance on remand.”14 It is not a 
given that any further proceedings would be “proper,” given the 
Court’s definitive ruling, albeit on a threshold question about the 
preliminary injunction. Specifically, Justice Kennedy writes that this 
may be a case wherein the president has “discretion free from judicial 
scrutiny.”15 Second, Justice Kennedy explains that “even if further 
proceedings are permitted, it would be necessary to determine that 
any discovery and other preliminary matters would not themselves 
intrude on the foreign affairs power of the Executive.”16 Again, he 
reiterates the deference due to the executive with respect to discovery 
matters. 
 
10. Noah Feldman, Take Trump’s Travel Ban Back to Court, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (June 29, 2018, 12:26 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-29/take-trump-s-
travel-ban-back-to-court [https://perma.cc/F2CM-FZHV]. 
11. Id. 
12. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2340 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“On the 
other hand, if the Government is not applying the system of exemptions 
and waivers that the Proclamation contains, then its argument for the 
Proclamation’s lawfulness becomes significantly weaker.”). 
13. Id. at 2423-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
14. Id. at 2424 (emphasis added). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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Indeed, this admonition sheds light on the Supreme Court’s 
unsigned order from December in In Re United States.17 In this case, 
Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California ordered 
the government to produce internal documents about its decision to 
terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
policy.18 The Supreme Court, however, issued a writ of mandamus, 
blocking the discovery request by a vote of 5 to 4.19  In dissent, 
Justice Breyer contended that “the Government’s arguments do not 
come close to carrying the heavy burden that the Government bears 
in seeking such extraordinary relief.”20 Based on Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, the soon-to-be retired jurist 
likely agreed that the “heavy burden” was satisfied because of the risk 
of intruding onto the executive’s powers.21 Additionally, DACA—
unlike the travel ban—does not implicate “the foreign affairs power of 
the Executive.”22 Yet, a majority of the court still intervened at an 
early juncture to halt intrusive discovery.23 
In light of Kennedy’s concurrence and the order in the DACA 
case, I do not share Feldman and Fiss’s optimism as to the prospects 
of discovery for the plaintiffs here, beyond the production of official 
documents concerning the waiver process. The court—with or without 
Kennedy—will not lightly entertain intrusive discovery orders. And if 
no meaningful evidence is added to the record, it is difficult to see 
how the district courts could find the proclamation unlawful on 
remand. 
II. How should the lower courts treat “this 
President,” as opposed to “the President”? 
On the eve of oral arguments, reporter Robert Barnes aptly 
summarized Trump v. Hawaii in a pithy headline for the Washington 
Post: “In travel ban case, Supreme Court considers ‘the president’ vs. 
‘this president.’”24 The Court chose the former.25 “[W]e must consider 
 
17. In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017) (mem). 
18. Regents of U. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 
WHA, 2017 WL 4642324, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017). 
19. In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 371. 
20. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
21. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing the need to not subject government actions to judicial 
scrutiny in certain instances and that executive discretion may also fall 
outside judicial scrutiny in some instances).  
22. Id. 
23. In re United States, 138 S.Ct. at 371. 
24. Robert Barnes, In Travel Ban Case, Supreme Court Considers ‘the 
president’ vs. ‘this president’, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2018), 
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not only the statements of a particular President,” Chief Justice 
Roberts explained, “but also the authority of the Presidency itself.”26 
Specifically, the court concluded that “[t]he entry suspension is an act 
that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by 
any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of 
this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid 
Proclamation.”27 
Justice Kennedy made this point explicitly in his concurring 
opinion.28 He referenced “the substantial deference that is and must 
be accorded to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.”29 He 
added that “an official”—in this case, the president—”may have 
broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny.”30  
At a minimum, Trump v. Hawaii—coupled with the arrival of a 
new justice—should further lower the temperature of the judiciary 
toward President Trump. A ruling against the president, however, 
would have sent the opposite signal to an emboldened lower-court 
judiciary. Still, the lower courts will no doubt take notice of the fact 
that the Supreme Court considered extrinsic evidence, including pre-
inauguration campaign-trail statements.31 Although that evidence did 
not tip the balance in this case, under the deferential standard of 
review the court applied, such evidence may yield a different result in 
cases involving domestic affairs—such as the DACA litigation—with 
more stringent scrutiny. 
III. How does the Constitution apply to aliens who 
are not seeking entry into the United States but have 
already crossed the border? 
Does Trump v. Hawaii inform other immigration-related 
litigation, such as cases concerning the rescission of DACA, the rights 
of asylum seekers and family-separation policies? The short answer is 
no, not directly. The level of scrutiny in Trump v. Hawaii was 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/in-travel-ban-
case-supreme-court-considers-the-president-vs-this-
president/2018/04/22/f33f1edc-44cb-11e8-8569-
26fda6b404c7_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dc133314069d 
[https://perma.cc/GUK3-4ETX]. 
25. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2418. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 2423. 
28. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2417-18. 
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extremely deferential, but it was employed in a limited context. Chief 
Justice Roberts explained that the “exclusion of foreign nationals is a 
‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely immune from judicial control.’”32 The 
key word in that sentence is “exclusion.” The pivotal question, then, 
is how does Hawaii extend to other pending cases that do not involve 
“exclusion?” 
The federal government’s power over immigration is often 
described as “plenary.”33 However, this authority applies differently 
based on an alien’s connection to the United States. Landon v. 
Plasencia recognized that “once an alien gains admission to our 
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent 
residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”34 Likewise, 
under the rule in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, “aliens receive 
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of 
the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country.”35 Congress’s authority in this sphere implicates four 
different classes: (1) aliens within the border, (2) aliens who recently 
crossed the border into the United States, (3), aliens outside the 
United States who are not seeking entry, and (4) aliens seeking entry 
into the United States. Trump v. Hawaii directly concerns the final 
category, but implicates all four. 
The first category considers the constitutional rights of aliens who 
are within the United States, yet lack lawful presence. Specifically, do 
noncitizens receive the full panoply of constitutional rights? The 
answer is complicated. First, aliens are generally afforded the same 
criminal procedure protections in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.36 
Second, aliens are afforded reduced substantive rights.37 For example, 
 
32. Id. at 2418 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
33. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255-57 (1984). 
34. 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 
(1950)). 
35. 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
36. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“Applying this 
reasoning to the fifth and sixth amendments, it must be concluded that 
all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the 
protection guarantied [sic] by those amendments, and that even aliens 
shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.”). 
37. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (“The fact that all 
persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process 
Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled 
to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship…. For a host of constitutional 
and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate 
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aliens may have a right to public education,38 but cannot make 
contributions or independent expenditures for political campaigns,39 
and are subject to a categorical ban on firearm ownership.40 Third, 
the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also 
vary for aliens within the United States. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the 
Supreme Court recognized that “once an alien enters the country, the 
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their 
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”41 Yet 
that holding merely raises the question of what process is due. 
Zadvydas acknowledged “that the Due Process Clause protects an 
alien subject to a final order of deportation . . . though the nature of 
that protection may vary depending upon status and circumstance.”42 
The courts still grapple with what sort of procedural protections are 
required for aliens within the United States.43 
The second category implicates aliens who recently crossed the 
border into the United States and lack lawful presence. In some cases, 
aliens who recently (an ill-defined term) entered the United States 
may be treated as if they had never entered in the first place.44 For 
example, the Third Circuit recently recognized that aliens who are 
“apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the United 
States . . . cannot invoke the Constitution, including the Suspension 
Clause,” because they were treated as if they were “alien[s] seeking 
 
distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and 
benefits for one class not accorded to the other…”). 
38. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“In sum, education has a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot 
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select 
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which 
our social order rests.”). 
39. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J.). Cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) 
(“Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this 
country.”). 
40. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d. 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015). 
41. 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
42. Id. at 693-94 (emphasis added). 
43. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. United States, 893 F.3d 153, 173 
(3d Cir. 2018) (holding that aliens with the requisite connection to the 
United States “enjoy at least ‘minimum due process rights…’”). 
44. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 38 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (finding that INS may proceed in exclusion hearing 
so long as it satisfies Due Process clause); Castro v. United States Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016); Osorio-Martinez, 
893 F.3d at 177. 
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initial admission to the United States.”45 Such recent entries may be 
afforded certain statutory protections—such as asylum laws46—but, 
under this rule, cannot avail themselves of substantive and procedural 
constitutional protections.47 There is also an open question of whether 
the federal government could expand “expedited removal” procedures 
into the interior of the United States—currently, regulations limit 
such removals to areas within 100 miles of the border.48 
The third category concerns something of a legal purgatory: what 
rights are due to aliens outside the United States who are not seeking 
entry.49 These cases arise under tragic circumstances.  Consider 
Hernandez v. Mesa, where a border patrol agent fired two bullets 
across the border, killing a Mexican national. 50 Here, the alien did not 
attempt to enter the United States, but was unlawfully seized by a 
federal agent.51 In 2017, the Supreme Court declined to answer 
whether damages were available under the Bivens doctrine.52 Instead, 
it remanded the case back to the 5th Circuit, with instructions to 
reconsider Hernandez in light of Ziglar v. Abassi.53 On remand, the en 
banc Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a Bivens claim can be 
stated based on application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to 
“foreign citizens on foreign soil.”54  Hernandez has been appealed to 
 
45. Castro v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d at 445-46, 
cert. denied sub nom. Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 137 S.Ct. 1581 
(2017). 
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009). 
47. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94 (citing multiple cases wherein 
deportation of aliens already within the United States must survive Due 
Process challenge). 
48. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45314, EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS: 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2 (2018).  
49. Though within Cuba’s territorial sovereignty, the United States had 
complete practical control over the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo 
Bay. Therefore, the framework in Boumediene v. Bush is not relevant to 
this inquiry. See 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“The detainees, moreover, 
are held in a territory that, while technically not part of the United 
States, is under the complete and total control of our Government.”). 
50. 137 S.Ct. 2003 (2017). 
51. Id. at 2005. 
52. Id. at 2007; The Bivens doctrine provides that “damages may be 
obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment by federal officials.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). 
53. Hernandez, 137 S.Ct. at 2006-08. 
54. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816-17 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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the Supreme Court a second time.55 In August 2018, the Ninth Circuit 
reached the opposite conclusion: a Mexican national in Mexico “had a 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from the unreasonable use of such 
deadly force” that is initiated by a federal agent “on American soil 
subject to American law.”56 The Supreme Court will likely have to 
resolve this circuit split. 
The fourth category implicates the holding of Trump v. Hawaii: 
how the Constitution applies to aliens seeking entry into the United 
States. Landon v. Pasencia stated the general rule: “[A]n alien seeking 
initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no 
constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit 
or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”57 Yet, even this rule has 
limits. Aliens seeking entry to the United State do not reside in a 
constitutional desert. In Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that an American “person’s interest in being united 
with his relatives [outside the United States] is sufficiently concrete 
and particularized to form the basis of an Article III injury in fact.”58 
In other words, the rights of Americans to be reunited with their 
family imposes judicial scrutiny on the power to exclude. But here, 
the Court does not apply its domestic establishment clause59 and 
substantive due process precedents.60 Instead, in Hawaii, the Court 
applied the most deferential strain of rational basis review.61 In other 
words, for “matters of entry and national security,”62 the Court’s 
“Establishment Clause precedents concerning laws and policies 
applied domestically” are simply inapplicable to the context of a 
foreign exclusion order.63 Trump v. Hawaii, far from a comprehensive 
explication of presidential power at the border, leaves these issues 
unresolved. 
 
55. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa 885 F.3d 811 (2018) 
(No. 17-_). 
56. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 829 F.3d 719, 730-31 (9th Cir. 2018). 
57. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (1982) (emphasis added). 
58. 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 (2018). 
59. See Josh Blackman, The Domestic Establishment Clause, 23 ROGER 
WILLIAMS L. REV. 345 (2018) (discussing domestic establishment clause). 
60. Cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (“Our 
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the 
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition.”). 
61. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2402.; see also Josh Blackman, The 
Travel Bans, 2017-18 CATO SUP. CT. REV.  29, 41-43 (2018) (discussing 
how national security concern resulted in a different standard of review). 
62. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2420 (emphasis added). 
63. Id. at 2417 (emphasis added). 
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IV. What is the scope of the president’s Article II 
powers to exclude aliens? 
The Hawaii court found that the “Proclamation is squarely within 
the scope of Presidential authority.”64 Therefore, the majority did not 
need to address the scope of the president’s Article II powers to 
exclude aliens. Had the court found that Congress did not delegate 
this authority to the president, or that we were in Youngstown’s 
“zone of twilight,” it would have had to answer this question.65 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion, however, addressed 
this question directly. He cited United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy (1950) for the proposition that “the President 
has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.”66 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to address the scope of 
the president’s inherent powers to exclude aliens. And that analysis 
will turn on the vitality of Knauff. This case addressed the interaction 
between the president’s inherent authority over entry and Congress’s 
rules concerning naturalization.67 Knauff was a German national 
married to an American citizen who was stationed in Frankfurt.68 She 
attempted to enter the United States, but was “detained at Ellis 
Island.”69 (An alien has not actually entered the United States until 
clearing the checkpoint).70 Without a hearing, an immigration official 
determined “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the 
United States,” and the Attorney General “entered a final order of 
exclusion.”71 The Southern District of New York dismissed Knauff’s 
habeas corpus writ and the Second Circuit affirmed.72 
 
64. Id. at 2415.  
65. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either 
a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.”). 
66. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis 
in original) (citing 338 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1950)). 
67. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. 
68. Id. at 539. 
69. Id. 
70. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1996) (any alien who attempts to enter 
at any other place besides that designated by immigration officers is 
subject to penalties). 
71. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539-40. 
72. Id. at 540. 
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Through a 1941 law, Congress gave the president the power to 
issue a proclamation, which would have the effect of rendering 
“unlawful” the “entry into the United States” of certain aliens when 
“the President shall find that the interests of the United States 
require that restrictions.”73 In other words, Congress permitted the 
president to effectively amend the statutory grounds for 
inadmissibility. President Roosevelt issued such a proclamation, which 
ordered that “no alien should be permitted to enter the United States 
if it were found that such entry would be prejudicial to the interest of 
the United States.”74 (This open-ended language is very similar to 8 
U.S.C. 1182(f), which would be enacted a decade later.)  
Pursuant to this proclamation, the Attorney General promulgated 
the regulations that denied Knauff’s entry into the United States.75 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Knauff argued that the “1941 Act 
and the regulations thereunder are void to the extent that they 
contain unconstitutional delegations of legislative power.”76 The Court 
rejected this argument.77 The majority explained that the power at 
issue in the 1941 act was not solely a legislative power; it was an 
inherent executive power.78 “The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental 
act of sovereignty,” Justice Sherman Minton stated.79 “The right to 
do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the 
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”80 Thus, 
there cannot be a violation of the non-delegation doctrine, because 
Congress is not delegating legislative power at all. The Court 
supported this argument with a citation to United States v. Curtiss-
Wright, which also rejected a non-delegation doctrine challenge 
because the president was exercising his exclusive powers concerning 
foreign affairs.81 
What was the 1941 act doing then, if not delegating legislative 
power? “When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the 
admissibility of aliens,” the Court explained, “it is not dealing alone 
with a legislative power.”82 Rather, “[i]t is implementing an inherent 
 
73. Id. at 540 n.1. 
74. Id. at 540-1. 
75. Id. at 541-542. 
76. Id. at 542. 
77. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. (citing 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). 
82. Id. 
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executive power.”83 In the normal course, the Court noted, “Congress 
supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United 
States.”84 However, “because the power of exclusion of aliens is also 
inherent in the executive department of the sovereign, Congress may 
in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise the power.”85 
Critically, the threshold decision to exclude—unlike the 
subsequent decision to deport—is subject to only the slightest form of 
review: “Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons 
who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within the 
province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review 
the determination of the political branch of the Government to 
exclude a given alien.”86 (This conclusion sounds in the doctrine of 
consular nonreviewability.)87 Though decided two years before 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Knauff’s analysis embodies 
the characteristics of Justice Jackson’s first tier—because the 
President is acting with a combination of his own inherent powers, 
combined with the co-extensive powers delegated from Congress, 
judicial scrutiny is at a minimum.88 
There are two possible reasons to hesitate before relying 
on Knauff. First, there was only a four-member majority.89 Justices 
William O. Douglas and Tom Clark recused;90 Justices Felix 
Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and Robert Jackson dissented.91 Majority 
decisions that only garner four votes do not have the same weight as 
a five-member majority.92 Yet, the Court has cited Knauff favorably 
over the decades, without any caveats—including the majority 
opinion in Trump v. Hawaii.93 Second, Justice Jackson—whose 
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86. Id. 
87. Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine of Consular 
Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 113, 114 
(2010). 
88. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A seizure 
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be 
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily 
upon any who might attack it.”). 
89. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 537. 
90. Id. at 547. 
91. Id. at 550. 
92. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on 
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2317-8 (1999) (describing a 
four-member majority as “fractured support”). 
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wisdom we all turn to when considering the separation of powers—
dissented.94 Indeed, his Knauff dissent did not even countenance that 
such an inherent power exists.95 This silence presaged his derision of 
the “vagueness and generality” of “inherent” powers 
in Youngstown two years later.96 
Eventually, the Court will have to address the scope of the 
President’s Article II powers to exclude. 
V. What is the permissible scope of a nationwide 
injunction? 
Over the past five years, the most powerful litigation tactic to 
challenge executive actions has been the so-called nationwide 
injunction.97 Litigants need only shop for a favorable forum, persuade 
a single district-court judge that they are likely to succeed on the 
merits, and hope that a higher court does not stay the order.98 Once 
the injunction is issued, the executive branch ensures that all of its 
officers around the globe cease enforcing the challenged policy against 
everyone—not just those plaintiffs who brought the suit.99 There has 
been a robust debate about whether district courts have the power to 
issue national or universal injunctions.100 Justice Neil Gorsuch 
euphemistically labelled them, “cosmic injunctions.”101 Though 
attorneys general past and present have protested such orders, they 
have nevertheless complied.102  
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Because the Supreme Court found that the travel ban was lawful 
in its entirety, it did not have occasion to address the validity of 
nationwide injunctions.103 Justice Thomas thoroughly addressed that 
issue in his solo concurring opinion:  
“I am skeptical that district courts have the authority to enter 
universal injunctions. These injunctions did not emerge until a 
century and a half after the founding. And they appear to be 
inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the 
power of Article III courts. If their popularity continues, this 
Court must address their legality.”104 
The lower courts have already taken notice. Earlier this year, a 
district court found that the attorney general could not deny Chicago 
certain federal funding because of the city’s “sanctuary” policies.105 
Rather than limiting its relief to Chicago, the court entered a 
nationwide injunction.106 A panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously 
affirmed the ruling, but split 2-1 on the validity of the nationwide 
injunction.107 The attorney general asked the en banc Seventh Circuit 
to limit the relief to the city of Chicago.108 The en banc court granted 
review but postponed ruling on whether the nationwide injunction 
should be stayed until the Supreme Court’s resolution of Trump v. 
Hawaii.109 The U.S. Solicitor General sought an application for a 
stay from the Supreme Court.110 Hours after Hawaii was decided, 
the en banc Seventh Circuit put the nationwide injunction on hold.111  
General Holder described nationwide injunction halting DAPA as “ a 
decision by one federal district court judge.”); see also Jeff Sessions, 
U.S. Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Federalist 
Society’s Student Symposium (Mar. 10, 2018), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-
remarks-federalist-society-s-student-symposium [https://perma.cc 
/P6SE-UUP4 ] (“But the Department of Justice—under Democratic and 
Republican administrations alike—has been consistent over these past 
several decades that nationwide injunctions gravely threaten the rule of 
law.”).    
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So far, the judiciary has been able to avoid the problem of dueling 
cosmic injunctions where one court orders the government to perform 
a certain action and another court orders the government to cease 
performing that action. Assuming one district court has the power to 
issue a cosmic injunction, do two district courts have the power to 
issue conflicting cosmic injunctions? This question can be framed in 
one of two ways. Broadly, should the fact that Court #1 found that it 
would be unconstitutional to halt a policy, prevent Court #2 from 
finding that policy itself is constitutional? Most observers would 
answer of course not: A district court does not bind another district 
court, even one in the same circuit.112 The narrower question is much 
tougher: Should the fact that Court #1 ordered the government to 
continue implementing a policy prevent Court #2 from ordering the 
government to halt the policy altogether? If the answer to the first 
hypothetical is of course not, what principle of federal jurisprudence 
would compel a different answer to the second hypothetical? The 
answer lies in the distinction between a precedent and a judgment.113  
The declarations in the first hypothetical do not give rise to the 
conflict; rather, only the ensuing injunctions trigger the conflict. 
Perhaps Court #2 seeks to avoid a conflict. As a result, it decides not 
to issue the dueling injunction. Instead, it could issue a mere 
declaration, or it could issue a declaration with a stayed injunction. 
Alternatively, if Court #2 decides to issue a dueling injunction, then 
Court #1 could subsequently modify its initial injunction. It is even 
conceivable that Court #2 could ask the plaintiffs to intervene in 
Court #1, and challenge the scope of that injunction. 
What, then, should be the rule to decide which injunction 
controls, in the hypothetical situation where a higher court does not 
intervene? Perhaps the first-in-time injunction ought to prevail. But 
that regime would perversely reward whichever litigant wins the race 
to the courthouse, and privilege the judge who rules in the quickest—
and most cursory—fashion. Why should one judgment estop all other 
courts from ruling? Perhaps a different rule should be that injunction 
that favors the status quo should be preferred over injunctions that 
disturb the status quo. Yet, the familiar four-factor test for 
preliminary relief asks courts to consider not only whether the status 
quo should be maintained, but whether the issuance would likely yield 
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“irreparable harm” or harm the “public interest.”114 A status-quo 
based rule would not provide much guidance. Ultimately, the conflict 
boils down into a game of jurisprudential chicken: which judge decides 
to back away from issuing a dueling cosmic injunction. Prudential 
concerns may prevent one judge from stepping on the toes of another 
judge, but these are not constitutional considerations. Given the 
insulation and autonomy afforded by life tenure, it is entirely possible 
that neither side would blink. 
There is not necessarily anything wrong with that independence. 
One district court judge is not supreme over another. It is true that 
in Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court arrogated for itself the power 
of judicial supremacy, such that it can determine, with finality, the 
meaning of the “supreme Law of the land.”115 But the district courts 
lack any pretense to this purported supremacy. Call it 
instead judicial inferiority: the mere fact that dueling cosmic 
injunctions can even exist highlights the fact that this sort of 
stalemate is constitutionally proper. Each judge takes the same oath 
to the Constitution, and has equal authority to rule on the 
constitutionality of an executive action—regardless of whether he or 
she is the first or last to do so, and regardless of whether his or her 
order disrupts or maintains the status quo. Court #1 should not 
control the declarations of Court #2. Likewise, Court #1 should not 
control the injunctions of Court #2. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court will address the scope of 
nationwide injunctions in the sanctuary city, or perhaps the DACA 
litigation. 
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